A Tutorial on Reed-Solomon Coding for Fault-Tolerance in RAID-like Systems

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Technical Report UT-CS-96-332
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July 19, 1996

This a preliminary version submitted to "Software, Practice & Experience." The paper is under revision and should be accepted in late 1996. Please see http://www.cs.utk.edu/~plank/plank/papers/CS-96-332.html for up-to-date information about the publication status of the paper.

Abstract

It is well-known that Reed-Solomon codes may be used to provide error correction for multiple failures in RAID-like systems. The coding technique itself, however, is not as well-known. To the coding theorist, this technique is a straightforward extension to a basic coding paradigm and needs no special mention. However, to the systems programmer with no training in coding theory, the technique may be a mystery. Currently, there are no references that describe how to perform this coding that do not assume that the reader is already well-versed in algebra and coding theory.

This paper is intended for the systems programmer. It presents a complete specification of the coding algorithm plus details on how it may be implemented. This specification assumes no prior knowledge of algebra or coding theory. The goal of this paper is for a systems programmer to be able to implement Reed-Solomon coding for reliability in RAID-like systems without needing to consult any external references.

*plank@cs.utk.edu. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CCR-9409496, and by the ORAU Junior Faculty Enhancement Award.
Problem Specification

Let there be \( n \) storage devices, \( D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n \), each of which holds \( k \) bytes. These are called the "Data Devices." Let there be \( m \) more storage devices \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_m \), each of which also holds \( k \) bytes. These are called the "Checksum Devices." The contents of each checksum device will be calculated from the contents of the data devices. The goal is to define the calculation of each \( C_i \) such that if any \( m \) of \( D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n, C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_m \) fail, then the contents of the failed devices can be reconstructed from the non-failed devices.

1 Introduction

Error-correcting codes have been around for decades [Ber68, PW72, MS77]. However, the technique of distributing data among multiple storage devices to achieve high-bandwidth input and output, and using one or more error-correcting devices for failure recovery is relatively new. It came to the fore with "Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks" (RAID) where batteries of small, inexpensive disks were used to combine high storage capacity, bandwidth, and reliability all at a low cost [PGK88, Gib92, CLG+94]. Since then, the technique has been used to design multicomputer and network file systems with high reliability and bandwidth [HO93, CLVW94], and to design fast checkpointing systems where extra processors provide reliability instead of disks [PL94, PKD95, CD96]. We call all such systems "RAID-like" systems.

The above problem is central to all RAID-like systems. When storage is distributed among \( n \) devices, the chances of one of these devices failing becomes significant. To be specific, if the mean time before failure of one device is \( F \), then the mean time to failure of a system of \( n \) devices is \( F_n \). Thus in such systems, fault-tolerance must be taken into account.

For small values of \( n \) and reasonably reliable devices, one checksum device is often sufficient for fault-tolerance. This is the "RAID Level 5" configuration, and the coding technique is called "\( n+1 \)-parity." [PGK88, Gib92, CLG+94]. With \( n+1 \)-parity, the \( i \)-th byte of the checksum device is calculated to be the bitwise exclusive or (\( \text{XOR} \)) of the \( i \)-th byte of each data device. Thus if any one of the \( n+1 \) devices fails, it can be reconstructed as the \( \text{XOR} \) of the remaining \( n \) devices. \( N+1 \)-parity is attractive because of its simplicity. It requires one extra storage device, and one extra write operation per write to any single device. Its main disadvantage is that it cannot recover from more than one simultaneous failure.

As \( n \) grows, the ability to tolerate multiple failures becomes important [BM93]. Several techniques have been developed for this [GHK+89, BM93, BBBM94, Par95], the concentration being small values of \( m \). The most general technique for tolerating \( m \) simultaneous failures with exactly \( m \) checksum devices is a technique based on Reed-Solomon coding. This fact is cited in almost all papers on RAID-like systems. However, the technique itself is harder to come by.

The technique has an interesting history. It was first presented in terms of secret sharing by Karnin [KGH83], and then by Rabin [Rab89] in terms of information dispersal. Preparata [Pre89] then showed the relationship between Rabin’s method and Reed-Solomon codes, hence the labeling of the technique as Reed-Solomon coding.
The technique has recently been discussed in varying levels of detail by Gibson [Gib92], Schwarz [SB92] and Burkhard [BM93], with citations of standard texts on error correcting codes [Ber68, PW72, MS77, vL82, WB94] for completeness.

There is one problem with all the above discussions of this technique — they require the reader to have a decent knowledge of algebra and coding theory. Any programmer with a bachelor’s degree in computer science has the skills to implement this technique, however few such programmers have enough background in algebra and coding theory to understand the presentations in these papers and books.

The goal of this paper is to provide a presentation that can be understood by any systems programmer. No background in algebra or coding theory is assumed. We give a complete specification of the technique plus implementation details. A programmer should need no other references besides this paper to implement Reed-Solomon coding for reliability from multiple device failures.

2 General Strategy

Formally, our failure model is that of an ensure. When a device fails, it shuts down, and the system recognizes this shutting down. This is as opposed to an error, in which a device failure is manifested by storing and retrieving incorrect values that can only be recognized by sort of embedded coding [PW72, Wig88].

The calculation of the contents of each checksum device $C_i$ requires a function $F_i$ applied to all the data devices. Figure 1 shows an example configuration using this technique (which we henceforth call “RS-Raid”) for $n = 9$ and $m = 2$. The coding on the checksum devices $C_1$ and $C_2$ is computed by using functions $F_1$ and $F_2$ respectively.

\[ C_1 = F_1(D_1, D_2, D_3, D_4, D_5, D_6, D_7, D_8) \]
\[ C_2 = F_2(D_1, D_2, D_3, D_4, D_5, D_6, D_7, D_8) \]

Figure 1: Providing two-site fault tolerance with two checksum devices

The RS-Raid coding method breaks up each storage device into words. The size of each word is $w$ bits, $w$ being chosen by the programmer (subject to some constraints). Thus, the storage devices are seen as containing $l = \frac{8n}{w}$
words each. The coding functions $F_i$ operate on a word-by-word basis, as in Figure 2, where $x_{i,j}$ represents the $j$-th word of device $X_i$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$D_1$</th>
<th>$D_2$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$d_{1,1}$</td>
<td>$d_{2,1}$</td>
<td>$c_{1,1} = F_1(d_{1,1}, d_{2,1})$</td>
<td>$c_{2,1} = F_2(d_{1,1}, d_{2,1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_{1,2}$</td>
<td>$d_{2,2}$</td>
<td>$c_{1,2} = F_1(d_{1,2}, d_{2,2})$</td>
<td>$c_{2,2} = F_2(d_{1,2}, d_{2,2})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_{1,3}$</td>
<td>$d_{2,3}$</td>
<td>$c_{1,3} = F_1(d_{1,3}, d_{2,3})$</td>
<td>$c_{2,3} = F_2(d_{1,3}, d_{2,3})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_{1,1}$</td>
<td>$d_{2,1}$</td>
<td>$c_{1,1} = F_1(d_{1,1}, d_{2,1})$</td>
<td>$c_{2,1} = F_2(d_{1,1}, d_{2,1})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Breaking the storage devices into words ($n = 2$, $m = 2$, $l = \frac{8k}{w}$)

To make the notation simpler, we can assume that each device holds just one word and drop the extra subscript. Thus we view our problem as consisting of $n$ data words $d_1, \ldots, d_n$ and $m$ checksum words $c_1, \ldots, c_m$ which are computed from the data words in such a way that the loss of any $m$ words can be tolerated.

To compute a checksum word $c_i$ for the checksum device $C_i$, we apply function $F_i$ to the data words:

$$c_i = F_i(d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n).$$

If a data word on device $D_j$ is updated from $d_j$ to $d_j'$, then each checksum word $c_i$ must be recomputed by using a function $G_{i,j}$ such that:

$$c_i' = G_{i,j}(d_j', d_j, c_i).$$

When up to $m$ devices fail, we reconstruct the system as follows. First, for each failed data device $D_j$, we construct a function to restore the words in $D_j$ from the words in the non-failed devices. When that is completed, we recompute any failed checksum devices $C_i$ with $F_i$.

For example, suppose $m = 1$. We can describe $n+1$-parity in the above terms. There is one checksum device $C_1$, and words consist of one bit ($w = 1$). To compute each checksum word $c_1$, we take the parity (XOR) of the data words:

$$c_1 = F_1(d_1, \ldots, d_n) = d_1 \oplus d_2 \oplus \ldots \oplus d_n.$$  

If a word on data device $D_j$ changes from $d_j$ to $d_j'$, then $c_1$ is recalculated from the parity of its old value and the two data words:

$$c_1' = G_{1,j}(d_j', d_j, c_1) = c_1 \oplus d_j \oplus d_j'.$$

If a device $D_j$ fails, then each word may be restored as the parity of the corresponding words on the remaining devices:

$$d_j = d_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus d_{j-1} \oplus d_{j+1} \oplus \ldots \oplus d_n \oplus c_1.$$  

In such a way, the system is resilient to any one device failure.

To restate, our problem is defined as follows. We are given $n$ data words $d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n$ all of size $w$. We will define functions $F$ and $G$ which we use to calculate and maintain the checksum words $c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_m$. We will then
describe how to reconstruct the words of any lost data device when up to \( m \) devices fail. Once the data words are reconstructed, the checksum words can be recomputed from the data words and \( F \). Thus, the entire system is reconstructed.

3 Overview of the RS-Raid Algorithm

There are three main aspects of the RS-Raid algorithm: the use of the Vandermonde matrix to calculate and maintain checksum words, the use of Gaussian Elimination to recover from failures, and the use of Galois Fields to perform arithmetic. Each is detailed below:

Calculating and Maintaining Checksum Words

We will define each function \( F_i \) as a linear combination of the data words:

\[
c_i = F_i(d_1, d_2, \ldots, d_n) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} d_j f_{i,j}
\]

In other words, if we represent the data and checksum words as the vectors \( D \) and \( C \), and the functions \( F_i \) as rows of the matrix \( F \), then the state of the system adheres to the following equation:

\[
FD = C.
\]

We define \( F \) to be the \( m \times n \) Vandermonde matrix: \( f_{i,j} = j^{i-1} \), and thus the above equation becomes:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  f_{1,1} & f_{1,2} & \cdots & f_{1,n} \\
  f_{2,1} & f_{2,2} & \cdots & f_{2,n} \\
  \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
  f_{m,1} & f_{m,2} & \cdots & f_{m,n}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  d_1 \\
  d_2 \\
  \vdots \\
  d_n
\end{bmatrix}
= 
\begin{bmatrix}
  c_1 \\
  c_2 \\
  \vdots \\
  c_m
\end{bmatrix}
\]

When one of the data words \( d_j \) changes to \( d'_j \), then each of the checksum words must be changed as well. This can be effected by subtracting out the portion of the checksum word that corresponds to \( d_j \), and adding the required amount for \( d'_j \). Thus, \( G_{i,j} \) is defined as follows:

\[
\ell'_i = G_{i,j}(d_j, d'_j, c_i) = c_i + f_{i,j}(d'_j - d_j).
\]

Thus, the calculation and maintenance of checksum words can be done by simple arithmetic (however, it is a special kind of arithmetic, as explained below).
Recovering From Failures

To explain recovery from errors, we define the matrix $A$ and the vector $E$ as follows: $A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & \ldots & n \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 2^{m-1} & 3^{m-1} & \ldots & n^{m-1} \end{bmatrix}$, and $E = \begin{bmatrix} d_1 \\ d_2 \\ \vdots \\ d_n \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ \vdots \\ c_m \end{bmatrix}$. Then we have the following equation ($AD = E$):

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & \ldots & 1 \\
1 & 2 & 3 & \ldots & n \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
1 & 2^{m-1} & 3^{m-1} & \ldots & n^{m-1}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
d_1 \\
d_2 \\
\vdots \\
d_n \\
c_1 \\
c_2 \\
\vdots \\
c_m
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
d_1 \\
d_2 \\
\vdots \\
d_n \\
E_1 \\
E_2 \\
\vdots \\
E_m
\end{bmatrix}.
$$

We can view each device in the system as having a corresponding row of the matrix $A$ and of the vector $E$. When a device fails, we reflect the failure by deleting the device’s row from $A$ and from $E$. What results a new matrix $A'$ and a new vector $E'$ that adhere to the equation:

$$A'D = E'.$$

Suppose exactly $m$ devices fail. Then $A'$ is a $n \times n$ matrix. Because matrix $F$ is defined to be a Vandermonde matrix, every subset of $n$ rows of matrix $A$ is guaranteed to be linearly independent. Thus, the matrix $A'$ is non-singular, and the values of $D$ may be calculated from $A'D = E'$ using Gaussian Elimination. Hence all data devices can be recovered.

Once the values of $D$ are obtained, the values of any failed $C_i$ may be recomputed from $D$. It should be obvious that if fewer than $m$ devices fail, the system may be recovered in the same manner, choosing any $n$ rows of $A'$ to perform the Gaussian Elimination. Thus, the system can tolerate any number of device failures up to $m$.

Arithmetic over Galois Fields

A major concern of the RS-Raid algorithm is that the domain and range of our computation are binary words of a fixed length $w$. Although the above algebra is guaranteed to be correct when all the elements are infinite precision real numbers, we must make sure that it is correct for these fixed-size words. A common error in dealing with these codes is to perform all arithmetic over the integers modulo $2^w$. This does not work, as division is not defined for all pairs of elements (for example, $(3 \div 2)$ is undefined modulo 4), rendering the Gaussian Elimination unsolvable in many cases. Instead, we must perform addition and multiplication over a field with more than $n+m$ elements [PW72].

Fields with $2^w$ elements are called Galois Fields (denoted $GF(2^w)$), and are a fundamental topic in algebra [e.g. [Her75, MS77, vL82]]. This section defines how to perform addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division efficiently over a Galois Field. We give such a description without fully explaining Galois Fields in general.
Appendix A contains a more detailed description of Galois Fields, and provides justification for the arithmetic algorithms in this section.

The elements of $GF(2^w)$ are the integers from zero to $2^w - 1$. Thus, they may be represented by binary words of length $w$. As detailed in Appendix A, arithmetic of elements in a Galois Field is analogous to polynomial arithmetic modulo a primitive polynomial of degree $w$ over $GF(2)$. However, we can describe this arithmetic without going into the details of such polynomials.

Addition and subtraction of elements of $GF(2^w)$ are simple. They are the XOR operation. For example, in $GF(16)$:

\[
\begin{align*}
11 + 7 &= 1011 \oplus 0111 = 1100 = 12, \\
11 - 7 &= 1011 \oplus 0111 = 1100 = 12.
\end{align*}
\]

Multiplication and division are more complex. They require two mapping tables, each of length $2^w$, which are analogous to logarithm tables for real numbers:

- $gflog[ NW ]$: A table that maps an integer to its logarithm in the Galois Field. ($NW = 2^w$.)
- $gfilog[ NW ]$: An inverse table table that maps an integer to its inverse logarithm in the Galois Field.

With these two tables, we can multiply two elements of $GF(2^w)$ by adding their logs and then taking the inverse log, which yields the product. To divide two numbers, we instead subtract the logs. Figure 3 shows an implementation in C: This implementation makes use of the fact that the inverse log of an integer $i$ is equal to the inverse log of $i \text{ mod } (2^w - 1)$. (This fact is explained in Appendix A).

```
int mult(int a, int b)
{
    int sum_log;
    if (a == 0 || b == 0) return 0;
    sum_log = gflog[a] + gflog[b];
    if (sum_log >= NW-1) sum_log -= NW-1;
    return gfilog[sum_log];
}

int div(int a, int b)
{
    int diff_log;
    if (a == 0) return 0;
    if (b == 0) return -1; /*Can’t divide by 0*/
    diff_log = gflog[a] - gflog[b];
    if (diff_log < 0) diff_log += NW-1;
    return gfilog[diff_log];
}
```

Figure 3: C code for multiplication and division over $GF(2^w)$

As with regular logarithms, we must treat zero as a special case, as the logarithm of zero is $-\infty$. Unlike regular logarithms, the log of any non-zero element of a Galois Field is an integer, allowing for exact multiplication and division of Galois Field elements using these logarithm tables.
An important step, therefore, once $w$ is chosen, is generating the logarithm tables for $GF(2^w)$. The algorithm to generate the logarithm and inverse logarithm tables for any $w$ can be found in Appendix A. As an example, we include the tables for $GF(16)$ in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$i$</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$gflog[i]$</td>
<td>$-\infty$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gfilog[i]$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Logarithm tables for $GF(16)$

For example, in $GF(16)$:

- $3 \div 7 = gfilog[gflog[3]-gflog[7]] = gfilog[4-10] = gfilog[9] = 14$

Therefore, a multiplication or division requires one conditional, three table lookups (two logarithm table lookups and one inverse table lookup), an addition or subtraction, and a modulo operation. For efficiency in the C code above, we implement the modulo operation as a conditional and a subtraction or addition.

### 4 The Algorithm Summarized

Given $n$ data devices and $m$ checksum devices, the RS-Raid algorithm for making them fault-tolerant to up to $m$ failures is as follows.

1. Choose a value of $w$ such that $2^w \geq n + m$. It is easiest to choose $w = 8$ or $w = 16$, as words then fall directly on byte boundaries. Note that with $w = 16$, $n + m$ can be as large as 65,536.

2. Set up the tables $gflog$ and $gfilog$ as described in Appendix A.

3. Set up the matrix $F$ to be the $m \times n$ Vandermonde matrix: $f_{i,j} = j^{i-1}$ (for $1 \leq i \leq m, 1 \leq j \leq n$) where multiplication is performed over $GF(2^w)$.

4. Use the matrix $F$ to calculate and maintain each word of the checksum devices from the words of the data devices. Again, all addition and multiplication is performed over $GF(2^w)$.

5. If any number of devices up to $m$ fail, then they can be restored in the following manner. Choose any $n$ of the remaining devices, and construct the matrix $A'$ and vector $E'$ as defined previously. Then solve for $D$ in $A'D = E'$. This enables the data devices to be restored. Once the data devices are restored, the failed checksum devices may be recalculated using the matrix $F$. 

8
5 An Example

As an example, suppose we have three data devices and three checksum devices, each of which holds one megabyte. Then \( n = 3 \) and \( m = 3 \). We choose \( w \) to be four, since \( 2^w > n + m \), and since we can use the logarithm tables in Table 1 to illustrate multiplication.

Next, we set up \( gfglog \) and \( gfilog \) to be as in Table 1. We construct \( F \) to be a \( 3 \times 3 \) Vandermonde matrix, defined over \( GF(16) \):

\[
F = \begin{bmatrix}
1^3 & 2^3 & 3^3 \\
1^1 & 2^1 & 3^1 \\
1^2 & 2^2 & 3^2
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 2 & 3 \\
1 & 4 & 5
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Now, we can calculate each word of each checksum device using \( F D = C \). For example, suppose the first word of \( D_1 \) is 3, the first word of \( D_2 \) is 13, and the first word of \( D_3 \) is 9. Then we use \( F \) to calculate the first words of \( C_1, C_2, \) and \( C_3 \):

\[
C_1 = (1)(3) \oplus (1)(13) \oplus (1)(9) \\
= 3 \oplus 13 \oplus 9 \\
= 0011 \oplus 1101 \oplus 1001 = 0111 = 7
\]

\[
C_2 = (1)(3) \oplus (2)(13) \oplus (3)(9) \\
= 3 \oplus 9 \oplus 8 \\
= 0011 \oplus 1001 \oplus 1000 = 0010 = 2
\]

\[
C_3 = (1)(3) \oplus (4)(13) \oplus (5)(9) \\
= 3 \oplus 1 \oplus 11 \\
= 0011 \oplus 0001 \oplus 1011 = 1001 = 9
\]

Suppose we change \( D_2 \) to be 1. Then \( D_2 \) sends the value \((1 - 13) = (0001 \oplus 1101) = 12\) to each checksum device, which uses this value to recompute its checksum:

\[
C_1 = 7 \oplus (1)(12) = 0111 \oplus 1100 = 11 \\
C_2 = 2 \oplus (2)(12) = 2 \oplus 11 = 0010 \oplus 1011 = 9 \\
C_3 = 9 \oplus (4)(12) = 9 \oplus 5 = 1001 \oplus 0101 = 12
\]

Suppose now that devices \( D_2, D_3, \) and \( C_3 \) are lost. Then we delete the rows of \( A \) and \( E \) corresponding to \( D_1, D_2, \) and \( C_3 \) to get \( A' D = E' \):

\[
D = \begin{bmatrix}
3 \\
11 \\
9
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 2 & 3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
A' D = E' :=
\]

\[
9
\]
By applying Gaussian elimination, we can invert $A'$ to yield the following equation: $D = (A')^{-1}E'$, or:

$$D = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 3 & 2 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 3 \\ 11 \\ 9 \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

From this, we get:

$$D_2 = (2)(3) \oplus (3)(11) \oplus (1)(9) = 6 \oplus 14 \oplus 9 = 1$$

$$D_3 = (3)(3) \oplus (2)(11) \oplus (1)(9) = 5 \oplus 5 \oplus 9 = 9$$

And then:

$$C_3 = (1)(3) \oplus (4)(1) \oplus (5)(9) = 3 \oplus 4 \oplus 11 = 12$$

Thus, the system is recovered.

6 Implementation Details

In this section, we examine three implementation and performance issues. These are computing the contents of the checksum devices from scratch, updating the checksum devices when a data device changes, and performing recovery.

Computing the Checksum Devices

Assume that the data devices hold data, but that the checksum devices are uninitialized. This is the situation when this technique is used for checkpointing, and when an entire stripe is updated in disk-stripping applications. There are two basic approaches that can be taken to initializing the checksum devices:

The Broadcast Algorithm (Figure 4): Each checksum device $c_i$ initializes its data to zero. Then each data device $d_j$ broadcasts its contents to every checksum device $c_i$. Upon receiving $d_j$'s data, $c_i$ multiplies it by $f_{i,j}$.
and XOR's it into its data space. When this is done, all the checksum devices are initialized. The time complexity of this method is roughly

$$n S_{\text{device}} \left( \frac{1}{R_{\text{broadcast}}} + \frac{1}{R_{\text{mult}}} + \frac{1}{R_{\text{add}}} \right),$$

where $S_{\text{device}}$ is the size of the device, $R_{\text{broadcast}}$ is the rate of message broadcasting, $R_{\text{mult}}$ is the rate of performing Galois Field multiplication, and $R_{\text{add}}$ is the rate of performing Galois Field addition (XOR). This assumes that message-sending bandwidth dominates latency, and that the checksum devices do not overlap computation and communication significantly.

![Diagram of checksum devices](image)

**Figure 5: The Fan-in algorithm**

The **Fan-in Algorithm** (Figure 5): This algorithm proceeds in $m$ steps — one for each $c_i$. In step $i$, each data device $d_j$ multiplies its data by $f_{i,j}$, and then the data devices perform a fan-in XOR of their data, sending the final result to $c_i$. The time complexity of this method is roughly

$$m S_{\text{device}} \left( \frac{1}{R_{\text{mult}}} + \frac{\log n}{R_{\text{add}}} + \frac{\log n + 1}{R_{\text{network}}} \right),$$

where $R_{\text{network}}$ is the network bandwidth. This assumes that there is no contention for the network during the fan-in. On a broadcast network like an Ethernet, where two sets of processors cannot exchange messages simultaneously, the log $n$ terms become $n - 1$.

Obviously, the choice of algorithm is dictated by the characteristics of the network.

**The Cost of Computing Updates**

The cost of computing updates is called the *update penalty*. This is the extra cost of maintaining the coding per data device update. The optimal update penalty for a system tolerating $m$ faults is $m$ updates to checksum devices [GHK+89]. This optimal value is achieved by the RS-Raid algorithm.

When a word of a data device is changed from $d_j$ to $d_j'$, the difference of the two is calculated $(d_j \oplus d_j')$, and sent to the $m$ checksum devices. Each checksum device $c_i$ multiplies this difference by $f_{i,j}$, and then adds it to its device with a parity operation. Thus, an update to a data word consists of one parity operation performed at the data device, a broadcast to the checksum devices, and then one multiplication and addition performed in parallel by each of $m$ checksum devices.
Cost of Recovery

In the RS-Raid algorithm, recovery consists of performing Gaussian Elimination of an equation
\[ A'D = E' \]
so that \((A')^{-1}\) is determined. Then, the contents of all the failed data devices may be calculated as a linear
combination of the devices in \(E'\). Thus, recovery has two parts: the Gaussian Elimination, and the recalcula-
tion. Since at least \(n - m\) rows of \(A'\) are identity rows, the Gaussian Elimination takes \(O(m^2n)\) steps. As \(m\) is
likely to be small this should be very fast (i.e. milliseconds), and thus should be performed redundantly by all
the devices (as opposed to performing the Gaussing Elimination with some sort of distributed algorithm).

The recalculcation of the failed devices can then be performed using either the broadcast or fan-in algorithm as
described above. The cost of recovery will be slightly greater than the cost of computing the checksum devices.

7 Conclusion

This paper has presented a complete specification for implementing Reed-Solomon coding for RAID-like sys-
tems. With this coding, one can add \(m\) checksum devices to \(n\) data devices, and tolerate the failure of any \(m\)
devices. This has application in disk arrays, network file systems and distributed checkpointing systems.

This paper does not claim that RS-Raid coding is the best method of coding for all applications in this domain.
For example, in the case where \(m = 2\), EVENODD coding [BBBM94] solves the problem with better performance,
and one-dimensional parity [GHK+89] solves a similar problem with even better performance. However, RS-Raid
coding is the only general solution for all values of \(n\) and \(m\).

The table-driven approach for multiplication and division over a Galois Field is just one way of performing
these actions. For values where \(n + m \leq 65,536\), this is an efficient software solution that is easy to implement and
does not consume much physical memory. For larger values of \(n + m\), other approaches (hardware or software)
may be necessary. See papers by Broder [Bro91] and Clark [CW94], and Peterson's book [PW72] for examples of
other approaches.

8 Acknowledgements

The author thanks Joel Friedman, Kai Li, Norman Ramsey, Brad Vander Zanden and Michael Vose for their
valuable comments and discussion concerning this paper.

References

[BBBM94] M. Blaum, J. Brady, J. Bruck, and J. Menon. EVENODD: An optimal scheme for tolerating double
disk failures in RAID architectures. In 21st Annual International Symposium on Computer Architec-
ture, pages 245—254, Chicago, IL, April 1994.


Appendix A: Galois Fields, as Applied to this Algorithm

Galois Fields are a fundamental topic of algebra, and are given a full treatment in a number of texts [Her75, MS77, vol.82]). This Appendix does not attempt to define and prove all the properties of Galois Fields necessary for this algorithm. Instead, our goal is to give enough information about Galois Fields that anyone desiring to implement this algorithm will have a good intuition concerning the underlying theory.

A field \( GF(n) \) is a set of \( n \) elements closed under addition and multiplication, for which every element has an additive and multiplicative inverse (except for the 0 element which has no multiplicative inverse). For example, the field \( GF(2) \) can be represented as the set \{0, 1\}, where addition and multiplication are both performed modulo 2 (i.e. addition is \( \text{XOR} \), and multiplication is the bit operator \( \text{AND} \)). Similarly, if \( n \) is a prime number, then we can represent the field \( GF(n) \) to be the set \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} where addition and multiplication are both performed modulo \( n \).

However, suppose \( n > 1 \) is not a prime. Then the set \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} where addition and multiplication are both performed modulo \( n \) is not a field. For example, let \( n \) be four. Then the set \{0, 1, 2, 3\} is indeed closed under addition and multiplication modulo 4, however, the element 2 has no multiplicative inverse (there is no \( a \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \) such that \( 2a \equiv 1 \) (mod 4)). Thus, we cannot perform our coding with binary words of size \( w > 1 \) using addition and multiplication modulo \( 2^w \). Instead, we need to use Galois Fields.

To explain Galois Fields, we work with polynomials of \( x \) whose coefficients are in \( GF(2) \). This means, for example, that if \( r(x) = x + 1 \), and \( s(x) = x \), then \( r(x) + s(x) = 1 \). This is because

\[
x + x = (1 + 1)x = 0x = 0.
\]

Moreover, we will be taking such polynomials modulo other polynomials, using the following identity:

If \( r(x) \mod q(x) = s(x) \), then \( s(x) \) is a polynomial with a degree less than \( q(x) \), and \( r(x) = q(x)t(x) + s(x) \), where \( t(x) \) is any polynomial of \( x \).

Thus, for example, if \( r(x) = x^2 + x \), and \( q(x) = x^2 + 1 \), then \( r(x) \mod q(x) = x + 1 \).

Let \( q(x) \) be a primitive polynomial of degree \( w \) whose coefficients are in \( GF(2) \). This means that \( q(x) \) cannot be factored, and that the polynomial \( x \) can be considered a generator of \( GF(2^w) \). To see how \( x \) generates \( GF(2^w) \), we start with the elements 0, 1, and \( x \), and then continue to enumerate the elements by multiplying the last element by \( x \) and taking the result modulo \( q(x) \) if it has a degree \( \geq w \). This enumeration will end at \( 2^w \) elements - the last element multiplied by \( x \mod q(x) \) will equal 1.

For example, suppose \( w = 2 \), and \( q(x) = x^2 + x + 1 \). To enumerate \( GF(4) \) we start with the three elements 0, 1, and \( x \), then then continue with \( x^2 \mod q(x) = x + 1 \). Thus we have four elements: \{0, 1, x, x + 1\}. If we continue, we see that \((x + 1)x \mod q(x) = x^2 + x \mod q(x) = 1 \), thus ending the enumeration.

The field \( GF(2^w) \) is constructed by finding a primitive polynomial \( q(x) \) of degree \( w \) over \( GF(2) \), and then enumerating the elements (which are polynomials) with the generator \( x \). Addition in this field is performed using polynomial addition, and multiplication is performed using polynomial multiplication and taking the result modulo \( q(x) \). Such a field is typically written \( GF(2^w) = GF(2)[x]/q(x) \).
Now, to use \( GF(2^w) \) in the RS-Raid algorithm, we need to map the elements of \( GF(2^w) \) to binary words of size \( w \). Let \( r(x) \) be a polynomial in \( GF(2^w) \). Then we can map \( r(x) \) to a binary word \( b \) of size \( w \) by setting the \( i \)th bit of \( b \) to the coefficient of \( x^i \) in \( r(x) \). For example, in \( GF(4) = GF(2)[x]/x^2 + x + 1 \), we get the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated Element of ( GF(4) )</th>
<th>Polynomial Element of ( GF(4) )</th>
<th>Binary Representation of ( b )</th>
<th>Decimal Representation of ( b )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( x^0 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x^1 )</td>
<td>( x )</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x^2 )</td>
<td>( x + 1 )</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Addition of binary elements of \( GF(2^w) \) can be performed by bitwise exclusive or. Multiplication is a little more difficult. One must convert the binary numbers to their polynomial elements, multiply the polynomials modulo \( q(x) \), and then convert the answer back to binary. This can be implemented, in a simple fashion, by using the two logarithm tables described in Section 3: one that maps from a binary element \( b \) to power \( j \) such that \( x^j \) is equivalent to \( b \) (this is the \texttt{gflog} table, and is referred to in the literature as a “discrete logarithm”), and one that maps from a power \( j \) to its binary element \( b \). Each table will have \( 2^w - 1 \) elements (there is no \( j \) such that \( x^j = 0 \)). Multiplication then consists of converting each binary element to its discrete logarithm, then adding the logarithms modulo \( 2^w - 1 \) (this is equivalent to multiplying the polynomials modulo \( q(x) \)) and converting the result back to a binary element. Division is performed in the same manner, except the logarithms are subtracted instead of added. Obviously, elements where \( b = 0 \) must be treated as special cases. Therefore, multiplication and division of two binary elements takes three table lookups and a modular addition.

Thus, to implement multiplication over \( GF(2^w) \), we must first set up the tables \texttt{gflog} and \texttt{gfilog}. To do this, we first need a primitive polynomial \( q(x) \) of degree \( w \) over \( GF(2^w) \). Such polynomials can be found in texts on error correcting codes [Ber68, PW72]. We list examples for powers of two up to 64 below:

\[
\begin{align*}
  w = 4 : & \quad x^4 + x + 1 \\
  w = 8 : & \quad x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 \\
  w = 16 : & \quad x^{16} + x^{12} + x^3 + x + 1 \\
  w = 32 : & \quad x^{32} + x^{22} + x^2 + x + 1 \\
  w = 64 : & \quad x^{64} + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1
\end{align*}
\]

We then start with the element \( x^0 = 1 \), and enumerate all non-zero polynomials over \( GF(2^w) \) by multiplying the last element by \( x \), and taking the result modulo \( q(x) \). This is done in Table 2 below for \( GF(16) \), where \( q(x) = x^4 + x + 1 \).

It should be clear how this enumeration can be used to generate the \texttt{gflog} and \texttt{gfilog} arrays in Table 1. The C code in Figure 6 shows how to generate these arrays for \( w = 16 \):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generated Element</th>
<th>Polynomial Element</th>
<th>Binary Element</th>
<th>Decimal Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^0$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^1$</td>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>0010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2$</td>
<td>$x^2$</td>
<td>0100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3$</td>
<td>$x^3$</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^4$</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
<td>0011</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^5$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
<td>0110</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^6$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^7$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^8$</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>0101</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^9$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{10}$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>0111</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{11}$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{12}$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{13}$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{14}$</td>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^{15}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Enumeration of the elements of $GF(16)$

```c
unsigned int q_x = 0210013;
unsigned int x_to_16 = 0200000;
unsigned short gflog[0200000];
unsigned short gfilog[0200000];

setup_tables()
{
    unsigned int binary_el, log;

    binary_el = 1;
    for (log = 0; log < 0177777; log++) {
        gflog[binary_el] = (short) log;
        gfilog[log] = (short) binary_el;
        b = b << 1;
        if (b & x_to_16) b = b ^ q_x;
    }
}
```

Figure 6: C Code for Generating the logarithm tables of $GF(2^{16})$